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ARTICLE
THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO COMMUTE:
IS IT STILL RELEVANT?
JEFFREY CROUCH*
On November 21, 2011, President Barack Obama commuted the first
prison sentence of his presidency, allowing Eugenia Marie Jennings to
leave prison on December 21, 2011, after serving less than half of her sen-
tence for a crack cocaine violation.1 Mandatory minimum sentencing guide-
lines held that the thirty-four-year-old Jennings would have to serve an
approximate twenty-two year prison term because of two minor prior con-
victions, but the president’s clemency decision allowed Jennings, who had
three children and was dealing with a recent cancer diagnosis, to leave
prison after roughly ten years behind bars.2
Recent American presidents seldom issue pardons, and they commute
sentences even less frequently than that,3 so clemency observers took spe-
cial note of the Jennings sentence commutation. Families Against
Mandatory Minimums president Julie Stewart hailed the decision, and the
American Civil Liberties Union expressed optimism that perhaps the Jen-
nings commutation might lead to further action by the Obama administra-
tion to end the “war on drugs.”4 P.S. Ruckman, Jr., editor of the
* Dr. Jeffrey Crouch is an assistant professor of American politics at American University
in Washington, D.C. His first book, The Presidential Pardon Power, was published by the Univer-
sity Press of Kansas in 2009. His research focuses primarily on the Constitution, the presidency,
and the separation of powers.
1. President Barack Obama Grants Pardons and Commutation, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 21,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/November/11-opa-1519.html.
2. Steven Wishnia, Obama Makes a Few Pardons on Unfair Drug Convictions, but Has
Granted Fewer Requests for Clemency Than Any President in the Last Century, ALTERNET (Nov.
23, 2011), http://www.alternet.org/story/153204/obama_makes_a_few_pardons_on_unfair_drug_
convictionspercent2C_but_has_granted_fewer_requests_for_clemency_than_any_president_in_
the_last_century/.
3. See Clemency Statistics, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm
(last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
4. FAMM Commends Obama for Exercising Clemency Power, FAMILIES AGAINST
MANDATORY MINIMUMS (Nov. 21, 2011), http://famm.org/NewsandInformation/PressReleases/
FAMMCommendsObamaforExercisingClemencyPower.aspx; Emma Andersson, Obama’s Com-
mutation: A Prelude to Systemic Reform?, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 23, 2011), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/obamas-commutation-prelude-systemic-reform. See also
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Pardonpower.com blog, characterized the Jennings commutation as “a big-
time decision . . . Obama’s first bold act of executive clemency.”5 Several
months later, though, it appears that whatever optimism existed earlier has
been tempered—if not extinguished—by executive inaction. As of this
writing in August 2012, Jennings remains the sole federal offender to re-
ceive a sentence commutation from President Obama.
In the following article, I will examine whether the president’s power
to commute sentences is still relevant in the twenty-first century. In Part I, I
begin with a brief review of the clemency literature. Next, I sketch a brief
history of the clemency power. Then, I consider the various forms that
clemency can assume and describe how to apply for a presidential pardon.
Part I ends with a closer look at pardon and commutation statistics for mod-
ern presidents. In Part II, I examine several “notable” twentieth century
commutations that I categorize as either justifiable or regrettable. More im-
portantly, I contend that these examples illustrate that clemency, and com-
mutations, in particular, have played a pivotal role at various important
moments in American history, a fact which may be easily overlooked given
how few clemency grants have been awarded by recent presidents. After
that, I consider some of the factors that are likely working to constrain pres-
idential pardoning practices. Finally, I review various scholars’ efforts to
sustain the important conversation about clemency, and conclude that the
clemency power—and the ability to commute sentences—will remain rele-
vant indefinitely.
I. CLEMENCY AND COMMUTATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
A. Literature Review
The president’s pardon power has not been one of the more popular
research topics for political scientists and legal scholars. In the last couple
of decades, though, political scientists David Gray Adler,6 Jeffrey Crouch,7
Louis Fisher,8 Mark Rozell,9 and P.S. Ruckman, Jr.,10 among others, have
contributed important work to the body of research on the federal clemency
Douglas A. Berman, President Obama Commutes Crack Sentence and Issues Five More Pardons,
SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Nov. 21, 2011), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/
2011/11/president-obama-commutes-crack-sentence-and-issues-five-more-pardons.html.
5. Arthur Delaney & Lucia Graves, Obama Commutes Crack Prison Sentence in ‘First Bold
Act of Executive Clemency’, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2011, 6:46 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2011/11/22/crack-prison-sentence-com_n_1108513.html.
6. David Gray Adler, The President’s Pardon Power, in INVENTING THE AM. PRESIDENCY
209 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989).
7. Jeffrey Crouch, Presidential Misuse of the Pardon Power, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
722 (2008); JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER (2009) [hereinafter THE PRESI-
DENTIAL PARDON POWER] ; Jeffrey Crouch, The Toussie Pardon, “Unpardon,” and the Abdication
of Responsibility in Clemency Cases, 38 CONG. & THE PRESIDENCY 77 (2011) [hereinafter The
Toussie Pardon].
8. Louis Fisher, “The Law:” When Presidential Power Backfires: Clinton’s Use of Clem-
ency, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 586 (2002) [ hereinafter When Presidential Power Backfires].
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power. They have been joined by legal scholars Daniel Kobil,11 Margaret
Love,12 and Samuel Morison,13 to name just a few of the major contributors
in that field. Together, the studies produced by these observers provide val-
uable context to interested readers.
B. History of the Clemency Power
Kathleen Dean Moore points out that the concept of clemency has
been around for a very long time: the Babylonians of eighteenth century BC
added clemency language to the Code of Hammurabi, the “oldest known
legal code”;14 in ancient Athens, an offender could be spared if he could
collect 6,000 signatures; in Rome, Pontius Pilate facilitated one of the more
famous pardons in history—the crowd’s decision to free Barabbas instead
of Jesus Christ.15
In England, the pardon power was often a source of contention be-
tween such authorities as the King and Parliament.16 The American Fram-
ers, leery of a powerful ruler given their strained relationship with King
George III, did not even create a true federal executive under the Articles of
Confederation, and they did not initially include clemency language in ei-
ther the New Jersey Plan or the Virginia Plan.17 Nevertheless, South Caro-
lina delegate John Rutledge wrote language concerning a pardon power into
9. Mark J. Rozell, The Presidential Pardon Power: A Bibliographic Essay, 5 J.L. & POL.
459 (1989); Mark J. Rozell, President Ford’s Pardon of Richard M. Nixon: Constitutional and
Political Considerations, 24 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 121 (1994).
10. P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Presidential Character and Executive Clemency: A Reexamination, 76
SOC. SCI. Q. 213 (1995); P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins,
Development, and Analysis (1900-1993), 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 251 (1997); P.S. Ruckman,
Jr. & David Kincaid, Inside Lincoln’s Clemency Decision Making, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 84
(1999); P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Seasonal Clemency Revisited: An Empirical Analysis, 11 WHITE
HOUSE STUD. 21 (2012) (forthcoming). Ruckman is also writing two books: George W. Bush and
the Pardon Power, and Pardon Me, Mr. President: Adventures in Crime, Politics and Mercy.
11. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the
King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1991).
12. Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the
President’s Duty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2000); Margaret Colgate Love,
Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Theory and Practice of Pardoning, 13 FED. SENT’G
REP. 125 (2001); Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of Clinton’s Last Par-
dons, 31 CAP. U.L. REV. 185 (2003); Margaret Colgate Love, Reviving the Benign Prerogative of
Pardoning, 32 LITIG. 25 (2006); Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the President’s Pardon
Power, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 5 (2007); Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169 (2010).
13. Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive Clem-
ency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2005); Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration
Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253 (2010).
14. KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 15
(1989).
15. See id. at 16–17.
16. Id. at 17.
17. See THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER, supra note 7, at 14–15.
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the margin of the Virginia Plan.18 Some Framers unsuccessfully attempted
to include limiting clauses that would force the president to share the par-
don power with the Senate, prevent the president from using clemency to
excuse treason, or disallow the pardon power’s use before an offender had
been convicted of a crime.19 The Framers ultimately decided to give the
president the virtually unlimited power to “grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”20
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist #74 that the clemency power
would provide a societal safety valve, allowing the president to defuse ten-
sions and put down uprisings through the promise of official forgiveness:
“in seasons of insurrection or rebellion . . . a well-timed offer of pardon to
the insurgents . . . may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.”21 In
addition to this crucial public welfare purpose, Hamilton notes, clemency
could also address situations where the law might provide for an unfairly
punitive sentence: “without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfor-
tunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”22
C. Forms of Clemency: Obtaining Relief
The short constitutional phrase “reprieves and pardons” includes a va-
riety of forms of pardon or, more accurately, federal executive clemency
(the “umbrella” term that includes several clemency options). For example,
the president has the ability to grant a full pardon, which is the most com-
plete form of forgiveness available.23 Recent presidents have relied almost
exclusively upon the full pardon, save for a handful of sentence commuta-
tions. A commutation occurs when the president merely reduces an of-
fender’s sentence—it does not go as far as a full pardon to, for example,
restore the offender’s civil rights.24 Other options for the chief executive
include the ability to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant a reprieve or res-
pite (which simply delays the full punishment), and to grant amnesty, which
is normally offered to a group rather than an individual.25
A petitioner may seek presidential clemency in two ways: first, and
most commonly, by going to the pardon attorney’s website and completing
an application for the particular form of clemency desired.26 The pardon
18. W. H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 15 (1941).
19. THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER, supra note 7, at 15–19.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
21. Alexander Hamilton, No. 74: The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the
Pardoning Power of the Executive, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 415, 417 (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
22. Id. at 415.
23. Kobil, supra note 11, at 576.
24. Id. at 577.
25. Id. at 576–78.
26. Application Forms, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/forms.htm#s3 (last
visited Apr. 7, 2012).
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attorney is an official in the Department of Justice charged with handling
case files and making recommendations about clemency to the White
House. The president ultimately makes the decision whether or not to fol-
low the pardon attorney’s advice. Second, a petitioner with the right con-
nections and resources may be able to reach the president himself, or the
president’s relatives, friends, or closest advisors, in order to make a more
direct case. Regardless of which path a petitioner chooses, the destination is
almost always the same: a dead end.
D. Modern Sentence Commutations: The Numbers
Among the various forms of clemency available, the commutation has
been a modern president’s second-favorite form of clemency next to the
pardon. Still, the declining use of both forms of clemency over the past
several decades is striking. In his twelve years as president, Franklin D.
Roosevelt granted 2,819 pardons and commuted 488 sentences.27 Harry S.
Truman granted 1,913 pardons and 118 commutations, and his successor,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, issued 1,110 pardons and 47 commutations.28 In
just under three years as chief executive, John F. Kennedy granted 472 par-
dons and 100 commutations, while his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, is-
sued 960 pardons and commuted 226 sentences.29 Richard M. Nixon
granted 863 pardons and 60 sentence commutations before resigning from
office in favor of Gerald R. Ford, who pardoned Nixon and 381 others,
while commuting 22 sentences.30 Jimmy Carter granted 534 pardons and 29
commutations as president, and his successor, Ronald Reagan, granted 393
pardons and commuted 13 sentences.31 George H.W. Bush granted 74 par-
dons and just 3 commutations in his term as president.32 Bill Clinton was
more generous than Bush, with 396 pardons and 61 commutations over his
eight years in the Oval Office.33 Clinton’s approach appears to be an aberra-
tion, though, as successive presidents have pardoned more on par with
Bush.
The decline of clemency is even more apparent if one considers the
percentage of successful clemency applications in the last three decades by
president.34 Jimmy Carter approved 21 percent of petitions for pardon or
commutation (563/2,627), Ronald Reagan granted 12 percent (406/3,404),
and George H.W. Bush approved only 5 percent (77/1,466).35 Bill Clinton
was more generous than his immediate predecessor in terms of positive
27. See Clemency Statistics, supra note 3.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Clemency Statistics, supra note 3.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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clemency decisions (457), but the volume of applications received (7,489)
drives his positive clemency decision percentage down to 6 percent, close
to George H.W. Bush.36
As staggering as these numbers may be, pardons and commutations
have all but dried up in the last decade. George W. Bush granted 189 par-
dons and 11 commutations out of 11,074 requests during his two terms, for
a clemency approval rate below 2 percent.37 The few successful applicants
during the Bush years shared common characteristics. According to Mar-
garet Love, a former pardon attorney, “almost every one of [Bush’s] post-
sentence pardons went to ordinary individuals convicted many years before
of minor offenses,” and “more than 2/3 of Bush’s pardons were granted to
people who never went to prison at all.”38 Eight of Bush’s eleven commuta-
tion recipients were “drug offenders who had served a substantial period of
time in prison.”39 Overall, safety appeared to be the underlying motive of
the Bush pardoning philosophy. To date, Barack Obama seems to be fol-
lowing suit—he has pardoned twenty-two offenders and commuted just one
sentence.40 From the beginning of his presidency through the first nine
months of fiscal year 2012, Obama has received 6,662 applications for par-
don or commutation, making for an overall clemency approval rate of less
than 1 percent.41 Scattered among clemency grants for marijuana and co-
caine offenses, among other things, are trivial grants to a coin mutilator,
Ronald Lee Foster, and an unlawful alligator hide dealer, Bobby Gerald
Wilson.42
The last ten years in particular are a sad legacy for what remains a
potentially potent presidential power. Indeed, there have been several occa-
sions in history when the clemency power, and commutations in particular,
were recognized as important tools of statecraft.43
II. CLEMENCY AND COMMUTATIONS FROM THE 20TH CENTURY
TO TODAY
As recently as the beginning of the twentieth century, the president has
used commutations in circumstances with national implications. Several
presidents have commuted the sentence of a popular political figure in order
to quell controversy or extend an olive branch.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Margaret Colgate Love, Final Report Card on Pardoning by George W. Bush (2009)
available at http://www.pardonlaw.com/materials/FinalReportCard.3.13.09.pdf.
39. Id.
40. See Clemency Statistics, supra note 3.
41. See id.
42. Pardons Granted by President Barack Obama (2009–2013), DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://
www.justice.gov/pardon/obamapardon-grants.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
43. For an overview of the executive clemency power used as a tool of statecraft see THE
PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER, supra note 7.
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On the other hand, there are presidents who have abused the power of
clemency in regrettable ways to further their own personal interests. The
following examples will illustrate how the president’s commutation power
has been—for better or for worse—a crucial component in a variety of his-
torically significant situations.
A. Notable Justifiable Commutations
The commutations of Socialist Eugene Debs, “Back to Africa” leader
Marcus Garvey, Puerto Rican Nationalist Oscar Collazo, and labor leader
Jimmy Hoffa were controversial, yet justifiable. These decisions were made
consistent with Alexander Hamilton’s view of clemency as a vital tool to
“restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.”44
1. Eugene Debs
Eugene V. Debs was a well-known Socialist who represented his party
in the presidential race five times. He was sentenced to ten years in prison
for violating the Espionage Act by criticizing the U.S. government and the
Selective Service Act.45 Debs received around one million votes in the 1920
presidential election while sitting in federal prison. Impressed by Debs’
vote totals in 1920 and his earlier success in the 1912 presidential race,
newly elected President Warren G. Harding “let it be known that he consid-
ers the fact that Debs was his opponent [in the election] puts his case in a
class by itself.”46 Previous President Woodrow Wilson had resisted the urg-
ing of top labor leaders to pardon Debs, but President Harding allowed
Debs to leave prison in Atlanta to travel unescorted to Washington, D.C. to
meet with the Attorney General about his case. The New York Times sug-
gested that any Debs clemency decision would stem from the president’s
concern for “political expediency.”47
Attorney General Harry Daugherty recommended a sentence commu-
tation for Debs based on the prisoner’s advanced age, but he also recog-
nized the volatile political context.48 In a report to President Harding,
Daugherty noted that, as Debs had not applied for a pardon, normally “no
action would be taken in his case.”49 However, clemency was a possibility
because of
the enormous mass of communications received in his behalf by
people who clearly regard Debs as a martyr to the cause of free-
44. Hamilton, supra note 21.
45. Wilson Refuses to Pardon Debs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1921, at 1.
46. Id.; President is Expected to Pardon Debs When Freeing Other War Offenders Friday,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1921, at 1.
47. Debs, Minus Guard, Visits Washington to Plead His Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1921,
at 1.
48. Daugherty’s Report on Release of Debs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1921, at 4.
49. Id.
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dom of speech and the most conspicuous example of the illegal
prosecution, and even persecution, of those who differed with the
policy of this Government and the course pursued by it in the late
war in Europe.50
Daugherty described Debs as “a man of much personal charm and im-
pressive personality” who may very well encourage others to commit
crimes, noting that “[i]n the work [Debs] has undertaken these qualities
make him a very dangerous man, calculated to mislead the unthinking and
afford an excuse for those with criminal intent.”51 What is more, Debs’
“prolonged confinement will have an injurious effect on a large number of
people who will undoubtedly regard his imprisonment unjustifiable . . . .”52
Harding did not comment publicly on his decision, but he ordered Debs’
sentence to cease on Christmas Day, 1921.53
2. Marcus Garvey
In 1927, President Harding’s successor, Calvin Coolidge, commuted
the prison sentence of Marcus Garvey and had him deported to his native
Jamaica as an “undesirable alien.”54 Garvey was a popular and charismatic
activist, writer, and speaker who, as a leading proponent of the Back-to-
Africa movement, successfully appealed to African-American followers in
the United States to participate in his plan to establish an African nation for
blacks, of which he would be president.55 In order to transport his support-
ers to their new home, Garvey established two businesses, the Black Star
Steamship Line and the Black Star Steamship Company, which he intended
to be owned and staffed only by African-Americans.56 The Black Star
Steamship Company eventually went bankrupt; Garvey was charged and
convicted of defrauding his investors, with a resulting penalty of five years
in prison along with a $1,000 fine.57 Shortly thereafter, a crowd of two
thousand African-American supporters protested, raised money, and signed
a petition to President Harding requesting bail for Garvey.58 Garvey backers
also sent “scores of telegrams” protesting his conviction to the Associated
Press’s Washington location in the weeks that followed.59 As Garvey de-
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Harding Frees Debs and 23 Others Held for War Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1921,
at 1.
54. Will be Deported Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1927, at 1.
55. Garvey Convicted in Black Line Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1923, at 21 [hereinafter
Garvey Convicted in Black Line Fraud]; Garvey Sentenced to 5 Years in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 1923, at 19.
56. Marcus Garvey, 60, Negro Ex-Leader, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1940, at 25.
57. Garvey Convicted in Black Line Fraud, supra note 55; Garvey Sentenced to 5 Years in
Jail, supra note 55.
58. 2,000 Negroes Ask Bail for Garvey, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1923, at 8.
59. Plead for Marcus Garvey, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1923, at 14.
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parted the United States for the last time, a crowd of 500 black supporters
gathered to bid him farewell.60 His popularity has endured—in the 1980s,
both Jamaican Prime Minister Edward P.G. Seaga and Rep. Charles Rangel
(D-NY) unsuccessfully sought a posthumous pardon for Garvey, who died
in 1940.61
3. Oscar Collazo
Puerto Rican Nationalists Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola at-
tempted to assassinate President Harry Truman on November 1, 1950, by
forcing their way into the Blair House, where the President was temporarily
staying.62 A brief shootout left Collazo wounded and Torresola dead, while
a White House guard was killed and two other White House guards were
injured.63 From his hospital bed, Collazo told the Secret Service that his and
Torresola’s attempt on Truman’s life was motivated by their desire to grant
Puerto Rico freedom from American control.64 President Truman was on
record as believing “the Puerto Rican people should have the right to deter-
mine for themselves Puerto Rico’s political relationship to the Continental
United States,” a view that he confirmed at a press conference the day after
the assassination attempt.65 In March of the following year, Collazo was
found guilty of four crimes, and faced the death penalty for two of them.66
On July 24, 1952, hours before the starting date of a new, more liberat-
ing Puerto Rican Constitution, President Truman commuted Collazo’s sen-
tence from death in the electric chair to life behind bars.67 The decision
apparently rested upon Truman’s desire to show friendship toward Puerto
Rico on the occasion of an important milestone.68 Collazo was released
from the remainder of his sentence in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter.69
4. Jimmy Hoffa
International Brotherhood of Teamsters leader James R. “Jimmy”
Hoffa was convicted of jury tampering and pension fund fraud and sen-
60. JUDITH STEIN, THE WORLD OF MARCUS GARVEY: RACE AND CLASS IN MODERN SOCIETY
207 (1986).
61. Francis X. Clines, Jamaican Asks U.S. to Pardon a Hero, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1983, at
A3; States News Service, Rangel Seeks Exoneration of Marcus Garvey, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1987,
at A39.
62. Anthony Leviero, President Resting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1950, at 1.
63. Id.
64. Paul P. Kennedy, Truman Guards Increased; Puerto Rico Jails Hundreds; Grand Jury
Here Summons 3, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1950, at 1.
65. Id.
66. Paul P. Kennedy, Blair House Assassin Guilty; Death Sentence is Mandatory, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1951, at 1.
67. Anthony Leviero, Assassin Spared by Truman in Gesture to Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1952, at 1.
68. Id.
69. Oscar Collazo, 80, Truman Attacker in ‘50, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1994, at A16.
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tenced to serve thirteen years in federal prison.70 Instead, he ended up serv-
ing just under five years behind bars when President Richard Nixon
commuted his sentence on December 23, 1971, on the condition that Hoffa
give up his labor management activities until March 6, 1980, the last day of
his original sentence.71 In a statement, the Justice Department noted that
Josephine Hoffa, Hoffa’s wife, “[was] suffering from a severe heart condi-
tion with attendant difficulties,” and that Hoffa had been an “excellent”
prisoner.72 Still, political considerations lurked in the background. The New
York Times pointed out that even after years in confinement, Hoffa “is still
enormously popular with rank-and-file union members,” and that the most
important Republican in New Hampshire, a key presidential primary state,
had pressured Nixon to free Hoffa.73 Nixon ended up receiving the Team-
sters union’s endorsement in the 1972 presidential race.74 On balance,
though, Nixon’s decision is still justifiable: the president refused to grant a
full pardon, forced Hoffa to very visibly forgo his popular professional role,
and successfully defended in court the restriction on Hoffa’s union activi-
ties.75 Gallup polls suggested that the commutation did not substantially
help Nixon’s job standing with the public. Indeed, Nixon actually dropped
from 50 percent approval between December 10 and 13, 1971, to 49 percent
approval between January 7 and 10, 1972.76
B. Notable Regrettable Commutations
As with any presidential power, clemency can be used responsibly or
irresponsibly. In the last several decades, there have been a number of in-
stances when presidents have granted clemency in extremely volatile cir-
cumstances. In time, some are viewed by the public as justifiable, such as
the pardon of Richard Nixon by President Gerald Ford. Others—for exam-
ple, Bill Clinton’s offer of conditional clemency to members of the FALN,
or George W. Bush’s decision to commute the prison sentence of I. Lewis
“Scooter” Libby—are less so.77 These two particular commutation deci-
sions were made more for the president’s personal interest than to pursue
justice.
70. Fred P. Graham, Nixon Commutes Hoffa Sentence, Curbs Union Role, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 1971, at 1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Nick Anderson, Teamsters Likely to Back Gephardt, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at
A22. Other Republican presidential candidates who received the Teamster union’s endorsement
include Ronald Reagan (1980 and 1984) and George H.W. Bush (1988). Id.
75. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1245 (D.D.C. 1974). Hoffa was last seen alive
outside a restaurant near Detroit in July 1975, and his body has never been found. See Joseph B.
Treaster, Hoffa Ruled ‘Presumed’ Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1982, at D17.
76. GEORGE C. EDWARDS III & ALEC M. GALLUP, PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL: A SOURCEBOOK
61 (1990).
77. See generally THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER, supra note 7.
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1. Members of the FALN
The FALN, or Armed Forces for Puerto Rican National Liberation, is a
terrorist organization that tries to undercut American influence over Puerto
Rico.78 The organization is not above using violence to accomplish its ends,
and has killed at least five and wounded many others through dozens of
bombings over the past several decades.79 On August 11, 1999, President
Bill Clinton extended conditional clemency to sixteen members of the
FALN, a decision that was heavily criticized by Republicans and even some
prominent Democrats such as Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Rob-
ert Torricelli (D-NJ).80 Clinton claimed support from such prominent politi-
cians as former President Jimmy Carter, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and
Democratic members of Congress from New York such as Jose Serrano,
Charles Rangel, Nydia Velazquez, and Eliot Engel.81 However, the decision
was “met with a chorus of protests from members of Congress and the
public.”82 Indeed, both the House and the Senate passed resolutions criticiz-
ing the move by overwhelming margins.83 What made his decision so per-
plexing was that Clinton made the offer despite the fact that federal law
enforcement agencies reviewing a clemency petition for the sixteen FALN
members, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Pris-
ons, and U.S. Attorneys in Illinois and Connecticut, unanimously opposed
mercy.84
Clinton was likely influenced by politics; specifically, the possibility
of solidifying Hispanic support in New York City at a time when his vice
president, Al Gore, was contemplating a presidential run (and would need
New York in his win column) and his wife, Hillary Clinton, was deciding
whether to run for the New York Senate seat soon to be vacated by long-
time incumbent Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY).85 Indeed, an e-mail from
Jeffrey Farrow, who was a co-chairman of Clinton’s interagency group on
Puerto Rico, noted that the FALN situation was “of high constituent impor-
tance” to Serrano and Velazquez, and that Gore’s “Puerto Rican position
78. Deborah A. Devaney, A Voice for Victims: What Prosecutors Can Add to the Clemency
Process, 13 FED. SENT’G REP., 163, 163 (2000).
79. Id.
80. When Presidential Power Backfires, supra note 8 at 589–90.
81. Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton to Commute Radicals’ Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
1999, at A15.
82. Michael A. Genovese & Kristine Almquist, The Pardon Power Under Clinton: Tested
but Intact, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE CLINTON LEGACY 75, 84 (David Gray Adler &
Michael A. Genovese eds. 2002).
83. See When Presidential Power Backfires, supra note 8, at 590–91 (House of Representa-
tives resolution passed 311 to 41, and Senate resolution passed 95 to 2).
84. David Johnston, Federal Agencies Opposed Leniency for 16 Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
27, 1999, at A1.
85. THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER, supra note 7, at 108–11.
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would be helped” if Clinton went through with the clemency decision.86
The deputy White House chief of staff rerouted that e-mail to the presi-
dent’s White House counsel—who has the president’s ear on clemency is-
sues—with a note of approval.87 Roughly 75 percent of Puerto Rican voters
in New York City self-identify as Democrats.88 A USA Today/CNN/Gallup
poll showed that 61 percent of respondents found fault with Clinton’s deci-
sion to offer clemency to members of the FALN (19 percent supported it),
and 60 percent believed that Clinton offered clemency to appeal to Hispan-
ics for support in his wife’s bid for the New York Senate (just 25 percent
believed Clinton was motivated by more altruistic concerns).89 A majority
of the American public believed at the time that Clinton essentially offered
clemency to attract voters. There is little reason to believe that public opin-
ion will shift favorably here, as it did regarding the Nixon pardon.
2. I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby
Perhaps President George W. Bush’s most well-known clemency deci-
sion was to commute the prison sentence of Vice President Dick Cheney’s
former chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, from two and a half years to
no time behind bars. Libby, trusted enough to be invited to “the highest
level of White House meetings,” had been caught up in Special Counsel
Patrick Fitzgerald’s investigation into who had revealed Valerie Plame to
be a CIA agent, and in 2007 Libby was convicted of four felony counts,
including perjury and obstruction of justice.90 Judge Reggie Walton, whom
Bush had nominated to his position, sentenced Libby to serve thirty months
in prison, two years of probation, and to pay a $250,000 fine.91
Curiously, Libby did not mount much of a defense at trial: he did not
testify himself, nor did he plead guilty to a lesser charge; he did not call
Vice President Cheney to testify, although he could have done so.92 In an
interview with CBSNews.com, Jonathan Turley, a George Washington Uni-
versity Law School professor, succinctly stated the likely motivation for
Libby’s lackluster showing:
86. Neil A. Lewis, Report by House Republicans Says Clemency for Puerto Ricans Was
Campaign Move, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1999, at A22.
87. Id.
88. Amy Waldman, New York’s Puerto Ricans Show Little Solidarity on Clemency Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at B1.
89. Tom Squitieri & Kathy Kiely, Clemency Issue Shadows Clintons, USA TODAY, Sept. 16,
1999, at 02A.
90. Mark Leibovich, In the Spotlight and on the Spot; Scooter Libby, Backstage no More,
WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A01; Carol D. Leonnig & Amy Goldstein, Libby Guilty on 4 of 5
Counts; Former Cheney Aide Convicted of Lying About His Role in Leak, WASH. POST, Mar. 7,
2007, at A1.
91. Carol D. Leonnig & Amy Goldstein, Libby Given 2 1/2-Year Prison Term; Former White
House Aide ‘Got off Course,’ Judge Says, WASH. POST, June 6, 2007, at A1.
92. THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER, supra note 7, at 120–21.
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Dick Cheney is very close to Libby and a lot of people view this
as a subordinate taking a bullet for Cheney[.] He’s not someone
who’s just loyal in the White House, he’s loyal as a criminal de-
fendant . . . . Libby is the ultimate inside player. He’s not the type
to cop a plea or turn on Cheney.93
President Bush commuted Libby’s sentence to no time served on July
2, 2007, leaving intact the quarter of a million dollar fine and two years of
probation.94 In a statement accompanying Libby’s commutation, Bush
noted his respect for the jury’s verdict and the special counsel (Bush had
appointed Patrick Fitzgerald to be a U.S. Attorney), but expressed his belief
that Libby’s sentence was “excessive,” arguing that the remaining penalties
were sufficient punishment.95
Bush’s claim to have granted the commutation to remedy an “exces-
sive” prison term is shaky, at best. A study referenced by the Washington
Post of federal sentences imposed in obstruction cases found that “382 peo-
ple were convicted for obstruction of justice over the past two years. Three
of four were sent to prison. The average prison term was 64 months, more
than five years. The largest group of defendants drew prison terms ranging
from 13 months to 31 months.”96
In other words, the study suggested that Libby’s sentence was quite
typical for others who had committed similar crimes. Even so, Bush de-
cided that Libby merited one of the handful of sentence commutations
granted during his presidency. He could have chosen to reduce Libby’s
prison sentence to whatever range he felt was not “excessive,” but instead
opted to wipe it out altogether. Why would Bush grant clemency to Libby?
Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer argued that a pardon would
be appropriate because Libby was never actually charged with revealing
Plame’s identity.97 Still, Libby’s conduct throughout the investigation led to
an indictment and conviction for committing four felonies, including ob-
struction of justice and perjury. Bush did not criticize the judicial process
used to reach the verdict, only the end result. Thus, the most likely motive
for the commutation is that he was rewarding a loyal soldier who had re-
mained silent and “taken one for the team.” Not surprisingly, the public
93. Vaughn Ververs, A Pardon for Libby?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.
com/2100-250_162-2542158.html.
94. George W. Bush, Grant of Executive Clemency, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT GEORGE
W. BUSH (July 2, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20
070702-4.html.
95. George W. Bush, Statement by the President on Executive Clemency for Lewis Libby,
THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH (July 2, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070702-3.html.
96. Matt Apuzzo, Attorneys See Irony in Libby Case, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/03/AR2007070301505.html.
97. Charles Krauthammer, Fitzgerald’s Folly; a Textbook Case for a Speedy Pardon, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 2007, at A21.
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overwhelmingly disapproved of the decision, 72 percent to 19 percent, ac-
cording to a CNN poll.98
The Framers of the Constitution created an all-but-unlimited clemency
power and entrusted it to the president.99 Most clemency decisions have
been an “act of grace” or “for the public welfare,” as the Framers had
hoped. Some recent presidents have shown less restraint than their prede-
cessors in calling upon clemency to serve their own personal interests,
whether to pursue votes (Clinton) or to protect close allies (Bush). The
Framers would likely not be surprised that clemency might be abused, and
provided for impeachment in more extreme circumstances as a check on
executive abuse of the pardon power. Today, the mass media and other
forces play a crucial role in monitoring, and sometimes constraining, presi-
dential clemency decisions.
C. Forces Constraining Clemency
Commutations and pardons have become rarer over the past several
decades. The decline of clemency is largely a consequence of a “tough on
crime” attitude exhibited by presidents and prosecutors reviewing clemency
applications, and the chief executive’s fear of making a mistake that could
set off a media “feeding frenzy”100 and damage the president’s public
image.
Former Pardon Attorney Margaret Love argues that pardoning has
fallen into disfavor since 1980, partially because “the retributivist theory of
‘just deserts’ and the politics of the ‘war on crime’ together made pardon
seem at the same time useless and dangerous.”101 Even more influential
than the stingy attitude of the president, Love argues, has been “the hostility
of federal prosecutors” and a reconfiguration within the Office of the Par-
don Attorney that left prosecutors in charge of advising on clemency deci-
sions.102 She notes how pardoning practices became incorporated into a
larger shift to be tough on criminals, and that officials were content to es-
sentially rubber-stamp the efforts of prosecutors instead of subjecting them
to a thorough review.103 At the same time, the president devoted little time
to clemency, a dynamic which, together with the rise in prosecutorial in-
volvement with clemency, made it “inevitable that the number and fre-
quency of clemency grants would steadily decline through the 1980s.”104
98. Janet Hook, Bush Had Little to Lose, Points to Score with Conservatives, L.A. TIMES,
July 3, 2007, at A17.
99. See U.S. CONST., supra note 20.
100. LARRY SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY: ATTACK JOURNALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000
ed.) (Sabato is credited, in the preface of his book, for coining the term “feeding frenzy”).
101. Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 1169, 1193 (2010).
102. Id. at 1194.
103. Id. at 1194–95.
104. Id. at 1195.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 15 10-MAY-13 13:09
2012] THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO COMMUTE 695
The power of the press and public opinion are also factors that cannot
be ignored by a president contemplating a controversial clemency deci-
sion.105 President Gerald Ford’s job approval rating dropped from 71 per-
cent to 49 percent in the few weeks following the Nixon pardon, as the
decision helped remind the public of Watergate and compromised Ford’s
public image.106 Indeed, according to legal scholar Jerry Carannante, “[s]o
much disgust has been expressed at pardons such as those granted to Nixon,
to the Iran-Contra defendants, and to [Marc] Rich, that presidents must
think twice before exercising the power and having to face the storm.”107
According to Carannante (writing in 2003), “[w]ith the increasing role of
the media in American politics and everyday life, the discontent with the
clemency power has risen proportionately.”108
Since 2003, the media have arguably become even more pervasive,
with Facebook (2004), YouTube (2005), Twitter (2006), and Tumblr (2007)
all serving to help perpetuate interesting stories via video or text posting
capabilities. The upshot is that anyone with a decent computer and Internet
connection can distribute a story more quickly than ever before. In this me-
dia environment, any presidential misstep can blow up quickly in a matter
of days, or even hours. A case in point: President George W. Bush
pardoned mortgage scammer Isaac Robert Toussie and then almost immedi-
ately took it back when a media investigation quickly uncovered how Tous-
sie’s father had made large, recent donations to Republicans.109
Clemency applicants face an unfriendly environment. Neither presi-
dents nor Department of Justice staff are inclined to go out of their way to
assist federal offenders, especially when one considers the potential cost to
be incurred by a mistake. As a result, clemency has been neglected even
while the number of clemency applications received by the Office of the
Pardon Attorney has skyrocketed since the Clinton years.110
D. Forces Constraining the Clemency Conversation
One of the toughest challenges for supporters of a more active role for
federal commutations—or any form of clemency—is to sustain public inter-
est long enough to build pressure for action or reform. A sustained drum-
105. See THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER, supra note 7, at 60–61 (“Though the media
cannot directly penalize the president for a pardon decision, they can raise the profile of a ques-
tionable pardon and persuade other political actors to put pressure on the president about his
decision.”).
106. Support for Ford Declines Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1974, at 81. For the reaction of
the public, the White House staff, the press, and Congress, see THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON
POWER, supra note 7, at 73–75.
107. Jerry Carannante, Note, What to Do About the Executive Clemency Power in the Wake of
the Clinton Presidency, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 325, 349 (2003).
108. Id.
109. See The Toussie Pardon, supra note 7, at 83.
110. THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER, supra note 7, at 64.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 16 10-MAY-13 13:09
696 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:3
beat for change has yet to develop; however, there are recent glimpses of
hope.
It has become cliche´ how most media attention devoted to clemency
focuses on freeing the White House turkey before Thanksgiving, or the
back stories of the few lucky clemency grantees named on a press release
from the Department of Justice that often comes out around Christmas. This
perceived pattern to clemency grants was challenged by investigative jour-
nalists Dafna Linzer and Jennifer LaFleur, whose employer, Pro Publica,
teamed with the Washington Post in December 2011 to release an important
two-part article focusing on the clemency process itself.111 Drawing upon
“previously unreleased records and related data,” the journalists explored
racial disparities in who obtained clemency during the George W. Bush
years, finding that 176 Bush pardons went to Caucasians and only 13 went
to non-whites.112 They also found that “advocacy makes a difference,” as
petitioners enjoying the support of a member of Congress “were three times
as likely to win a pardon as those without such backing.”113 If the painstak-
ing approach of these journalists were to be paired with sufficient resources,
it might help paint a broader picture of how well the clemency process has
worked under Bush’s predecessors, too.
Much of what is known about the internal working of the clemency
process is due to former Pardon Attorney Margaret Love,114 who has writ-
ten a number of pieces that explain, among other issues, the historical de-
velopment of the president’s clemency apparatus, the internal forces
impacting clemency’s recent decline, and suggestions for reform. For the
day-to-day update on clemency decisions, Internet surfers have
Pardonpower.com,115 edited by P.S. Ruckman, Jr., and Sentencing Law and
Policy,116 a blog maintained by Douglas A. Berman. These websites draw
regular viewers and direct mass media attention to clemency issues as
breaking news occurs. Other observers are helping to create long-term in-
frastructure for clemency petitioners. Professor Mark Osler of the Univer-
sity of St. Thomas School of Law has started the nation’s first federal
111. Dafna Linzer & Jennifer LaFleur, Presidential Pardons Heavily Favor Whites, PROPUB-
LICA (Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/shades-of-mercy-presidential-forgiveness-
heavily-favors-whites; Dafna Linzer, Pardon Applicants Benefit From Friends in High Places,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/pardon-applicants-benefit-from-
friends-in-high-places.
112. Linzer & LaFleur, Presidential Pardons Heavily Favor Whites, supra note 111.
113. Linzer, Pardon Applicants Benefit From Friends in High Places, supra note 111.
114. Margaret Love’s website is Pardonlaw.com, available at http://www.pardonlaw.com (last
visited Apr. 13, 2012).
115. P.S. Ruckman, Jr.’s website is Pardonpower.com, available at http://www.pardonpower.
com (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). Ruckman’s personal website is http://psruckman.com (last vis-
ited Apr. 13, 2012).
116. Douglas A. Berman’s website is Sentencing Law and Policy, available at http://sentenc-
ing.typepad.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). Berman’s personal website is http://moritzlaw.osu.
edu/faculty/bios.php?ID=5 (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
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commutation clinic,117 and former Maryland Governor Bob Ehrlich is plan-
ning “the nation’s first law school clinic and training program devoted to
pardons.”118 All of these contributions point toward the same vital end: sus-
taining interest in clemency-related issues and providing analysis and rec-
ommendations for improving the status quo. Our role as scholars and
observers is to continue to remind the president—and the American pub-
lic—of the good the clemency power can do when used responsibly and
regularly. As long as injustice and societal unrest remain very real possibili-
ties—and they show no signs of going away—the president must be willing
to use the pardon power.
CONCLUSION
Clemency has always been integral to justice systems worldwide and
throughout time. Over seventy years ago, Attorney General Homer Cum-
mings oversaw publication of a four-volume series of books entitled The
Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures.119 One volume focused
entirely on federal and state pardons and reviewed various pardoning
schemes throughout the history of the world, from the time of the Bible,
through Greece, Rome, Germany, France, England, and the United States.
The editors of the book pointed out that the pardon power has never been
perfect, but has certainly had its moments under the right circumstances:
The history of pardons thus teaches one lesson: the prerogative
has always been near to absolute power and has been exposed to
abuse. At the same time it has been almost uninterruptedly within
easy reach of the creative mind of mankind as a weapon to break
the rigidity of law and custom and their resistance to progress and
reform.120
The president of the United States has used the ability to grant official
mercy at a variety of crucial junctures in the life of the nation. In recent
years, and for various reasons, presidents have chosen to exercise their
clemency power very carefully, often deciding not to use it at all, or to
abuse it for their own personal interest. At its best, the pardon power can
provide people with a fresh start, as exemplified by Eugenia Marie Jen-
nings. Ms. Jennings’ situation is just one example of why clemency is a
unique power—and responsibility—which will always be relevant.
117. Kate Metzger, Federal Commutation Clinic at Law School the First in the Nation, UNI-
VERSITY OF ST. THOMAS NEWSROOM (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.stthomas.edu/bulletin/2011/09/
12/federal-commutation-clinic. Osler’s personal website is http://www.stthomas.edu/law/faculty
staff/staff/interprofessionalcenter/oslermark/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
118. Dafna Linzer, Law School Clinic for Pardons Planned, PROPUBLICA, (Mar. 5, 2012)
http://www.propublica.org/article/law-school-clinic-for-pardons-is-planned. A profile of Governor
Ehrlich is available on the Washington Post website at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
robert-ehrlich-r/gIQAs6YoAP_topic.html.
119. 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES
52–53 (Wayne Morse, Henry Weihofen & Hans Von Hentig eds., 1939).
120. Id.
